A strait with great geopolitical importance, The Bab-el-Mandeb also commonly known as "Gate of Tears" connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian sea between Yemen and Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea. It connects the exclusive economic zones of Djibouti, Yemen and Somalia on one hand and of Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in the Red Sea on the other hand. Through this narrow passage, ships travel from ASIA and the MIDDLE EAST moves towards EUROPE through the Suez Canal. The location of it plays a crucial role in westbound maritime trade routes. Most exports of petroleum and natural gas from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline pass through both the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. The strait is 26 kilometres (14 nautical miles) wide at its narrowest point, limiting tanker traffic to two-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Along with its importance there are many issues which are ongoing in this region. Yet the importance is high as the strait serves as a vital link between Asia, Gulf, Europe and North America.
Issue
In 1869, the Suez Canal opened near north eastern Egypt which made the Bab-el-Mandeb a strategic choke point. This has been evident between present day Yemen and the Perim Island on the side of the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti, Eritrea and the Seven Brothers islands at the horn of Africa site, and from Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Today the Yemeni civil war, Iran backed Houthis and the Yemeni national forces are key land based security actors around the strait with regional powers including Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates trying to influence the conflict.
Following the October 2023 invasion of the Gaza Strip by the IDF after the Hamas pogrom of October 7 of that year, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen attacked Israel, American and British tankers in the Red Sea, and commercial ships. A conflict continued until a ceasefire was brokered in late 2025. With asymmetric warfare, the Houthis used anti-access/area denial to change the security situation in the Red Sea, using the chokepoint of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the national waters of Yemen as a strategic advantage. The Houthis have been backed by Iran in the broader Axis of Resistance. The CRINK-alliance have allegedly supported the Houthis with weapons, dual-use weapons and geospatial intelligence. There have been references to tracked navy ships in the area from Russia.
Following the Red Sea Crisis, a number of new operations were initiated, including the EU-led Operation Aspides and Operation Prosperity Guardian under the Combined Maritime Forces, all to ensure safe passage through the Bab-el-Mandeb. Previous measures have included the Djibouti Code of Conduct to ensure safe passage against pirates.
In April 2026, Houthi official Hussein al-Ezzi warned that the Bab al-Mandeb Strait could be closed, stating that "no force would be able to reopen it" if Sanaa makes the decision. The warning came amid heightened tensions over the US naval blockade of Iran. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is strategically located at a key point of the Belt and Road Initiative, making it a focal point of competition among major powers, such as US, China, Japan, and Europe. In this context, the geopolitical importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait continues to grow. Countries are vying for influence in the region through political, economic, and military means.
As for the maritime security, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region faces a significant threat from piracy, which severely endangers the security of global trade and energy transportation. In recent years, Somalia-based pirates have targeted passing vessels, causing substantial losses. Combating piracy and ensuring maritime security is a challenge that requires international cooperation.
The marine environmental protection in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is becoming increasingly prominent and should not be disregarded. Overfishing, marine pollution, and ecological destruction are serious issues that threaten the region’s marine ecosystems and fishery resources. Strengthening marine environmental protection is essential for maintaining the ecological balance and sustainable development of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait area.
Why it Matters?
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is a vital maritime channel connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. The importance of the Bab el-Mandeb also lies in its geographical location and geopolitical value as a shipping lane. It not only affects global trade activities, but also has a direct impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Bab el
Mandeb’s irreplaceable geopolitical importance is given by the role of the Suez Canal for the global supply chains. In this context, the six-day grounding of the Ever Given in the Suez Canal in 2021 resulted in a loss of approximately $9 billion per day in trade, which means that if passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were to be closed, it would be economically costly.
More importantly, most of the oil exports from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline also need to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In the first half of 2023, about 9.2 million barrels of oil per day passed through the Suez Canal, accounting for about 9% of the global demand, which boosted 4.1% compared to the whole of 2021 (EIA, 2023). If cargo ships are unable to pass through the strait, the Sumed pipeline will be the only means of oil transportation for most Persian Gulf oil exporters.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a vital maritime channel connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe, with a significant portion of global trade passing through its waters each year. According to World Bank data, approximately 30% of oil and 40% of dry goods are transported via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, making the Bab el-Mandeb Strait a crucial route for these shipments. Also, the
port cities in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region, such as Djibouti, Somalia, and Yemen, act as trade hubs. These cities facilitate trade between countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe, contributing to the global economy’s growth.
Nevertheless, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a crucial route for African energy exports. The region boasts rich oil and natural gas resources, which are transported to Asia, Europe, and other parts of the world through this strait. As African energy exports continue to increase, the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait becomes more pronounced.
As the world’s largest energy consumer, China’s demand for oil and natural gas is immense. The African countries in the el-Mandeb Strait region, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Yemen, are significant suppliers of China’s energy imports. Ensuring the security and stability of the Bab el Mandeb Strait is of great importance to China’s energy supply security.
Evidence and Analysis
The Suez Canal, the SUMED pipeline, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are strategic routes for Persian Gulf oil and natural gas shipments to Europe and North America. Total oil shipments via these routes accounted for about 12% of total seaborne-traded oil in the first half of 2023, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments accounted for about 8% of worldwide LNG trade.
The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline are located in Egypt and connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. The SUMED pipeline transports crude oil north through Egypt and has a capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Most exports of petroleum and natural gas from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America pass through multiple chokepoints, including the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline and both the Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.
Oil Shipments
Northbound oil flows toward Europe via the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline fell between 2018 and 2020. Renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran reduced all exports from Iran, including those through the Suez Canal. In addition, less crude oil and oil products from Middle East producers moved through the Suez Canal because Europe imported less oil from the Middle East and more from the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic further reduced flows through the Suez Canal because of slowing global oil demand.
In the first half of 2023, northbound crude oil flowing through the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline had increased by more than 60% from 2020, as demand in Europe and the United States
rose from pandemic-induced lows. Also, Western sanctions on Russia’s oil beginning in early 2022 shifted global trade patterns, leading Europe to import more oil from the Middle East via the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline and less from Russia.
Southbound shipments through the Suez Canal rose significantly between 2021 and 2023, largely because of Western sanctions on Russia’s oil exports. Oil exports from Russia accounted for 74% of Suez southbound oil traffic in the first half of 2023, up from 30% in 2021. Most of those export volumes were destined for India and China, which imported mostly crude oil from Russia. The Middle East, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased imports of refined oil products from Russia in 2022 and the first half of 2023 in order to generate electric power or to store or re-export.
LNG shipments
LNG flows through the Suez Canal in both directions rose to a combined peak in 2021 and 2022 of 4.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) before total flows declined in the first half of 2023 to 4.1 Bcf/d. Southbound LNG flows more than doubled from 2020 to 2021, mainly driven by growing exports from the United States and Egypt heading to Asia. In 2022 and the first half of 2023, southbound LNG volumes via the Suez Canal declined as U.S. and Egyptian LNG exports both favoured European destinations over Asian markets, supplanting some of the natural gas exports that Russia historically sent to Europe. Most of the variation in northbound volumes reflects changes in Qatar’s exports to Europe (via the Suez Canal) compared with Asia. Qatar also sent more LNG to Europe in 2022 to replace some volumes from Russia, increasing northbound flows.
Although oil flow trends through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait are similar to those of the Suez Canal, more oil exits the Red Sea (northbound via the Suez Canal and southbound via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait) than enters the Red Sea through these chokepoints. Saudi Arabia transports some crude oil from the Persian Gulf via pipeline to the Red Sea for export mostly to Europe. LNG flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have matched those in the Suez Canal over the last few years because the few LNG import terminals in the Red Sea have been used less.
On February 28 — the same day the U.S. and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury — the Houthis threatened to resume Red Sea attacks. Industry bodies reacted immediately. The Baltic and International Maritime Council warned that vessels tied to U.S. or Israeli interests faced elevated risk. UK Maritime Trade Operations issued an advisory flagging increased danger across the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Red Sea corridor. Then, nothing.
On March 5, Houthi paramount leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared the group’s “fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it.” The statement was conditional, not committing. Through the first three weeks of the war, Hezbollah fired rockets
at Israel. Iraqi Shia militias struck U.S. targets in Kuwait and Jordan. The Houthis — Iran’s most geographically advantaged proxy, astride the second most important maritime chokepoint in the region — stayed quiet.
Michael Hanna of the International Crisis Group said plainly: “We are not exactly sure, to be honest.” CSIS and Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies each published assessments attempting to account for the reticence. The Times reported on March 16 that the Houthis were awaiting an Iranian signal. Bab el-Mandeb remained the only functioning artery for Saudi crude, with roughly 30 tankers near Yanbu within Houthi range at any given moment.
On March 27, Houthi supporters rallied in Sanaa in “solidarity with Iran and Lebanon.” Military spokesman Yahya Saree warned that the U.S. and Israel would not be permitted to use the Red Sea as a base against Iran. The next day, March 28, the Houthis fired their first ballistic missile at Israel since October 2025. The IDF intercepted it. A second salvo of a cruise missile and drones followed the same day. On April 1, Saree claimed a coordinated “joint operation” with Iranian and Hezbollah forces targeting Israeli military sites. But the Houthi attacks then ceased and the group again went quiet.
On April 7, a senior Iranian source told Reuters that “if the situation gets out of control, Iran’s allies will also close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.” As of this writing, no commercial vessel has been struck in 2026. The USS George H.W. Bush is off Namibia. Saudi crude still flows through Yanbu. The Houthis have reshaped global naval movement without firing a shot at shipping.
Who They Actually Are
Most American coverage describes the Houthis as “Iran-backed Yemeni rebels” and leaves it there. That shorthand obscures more than it reveals.
The movement emerged from the “Believing Youth” (al-Shabab al-Mo’men) Zaydi revivalist study circles that formed in Yemen’s northern Saada province in the 1990s. The Houthi family’s grievances were not invented in Tehran. They run back to Yemen’s 1962 revolution, which ended a millennium of Zaydi imamate rule in the north and marginalized the Hashemite clerical class from which the al-Houthis claim descent. The founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was killed by Yemeni government forces in 2004 in the first of six Saada wars with the Saleh regime. His recorded lectures still form the core indoctrination curriculum today.
The current leader is Hussein’s younger brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. He holds the title Alam al-Huda — “Icon of Guidance” — signifying his claim as supreme leader chosen by God and entitled to absolute obedience from his followers. He has not appeared publicly in weeks. Israeli airstrikes in August 2025 killed 12 members of the Houthi cabinet including Prime Minister
Ahmed al-Rahawi; Chief of Staff Mohammed al-Ghamari was killed in October 2025. Houthi senior leaders have been instructed to stay off-grid.
Organizationally, the movement is highly personalized and familial. The “preventive security” apparatus — modelled explicitly on Iran’s IRGC and reportedly set up with Hezbollah and Iranian trainers — reports directly to Abdul-Malik al-Houthi rather than to any Yemeni state institution. A U.N. Panel of Experts has described it as the most influential intelligence apparatus in Houthi
controlled areas. The key public figures are Yahya Saree (military spokesman), Mohammed Abdulsalam (chief negotiator, under U.S. sanctions), and Mahdi al-Mashat (formally “commander-in-chief”). But real authority rests with Abdul-Malik and a narrow circle of family and clan figures in Saada.
What motivates them is a blend Washington consistently underestimates: Yemeni nationalism, Zaydi-Hadawi revivalism, Hashemite hereditary entitlement, and an anti-imperial ideology that borrows from Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih but does not depend on it. Their slogan — “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam” — predates Gaza and is core identity, not opportunistic branding. They are not popular. A 2024 Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies poll found that only 8 percent of Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas viewed the movement positively. They rule by coercion. Their revenue model — war profiteering, smuggling, extortion of humanitarian aid, racketeering through the port of Hodeidah — has immiserated Yemen rather than developed it.
What happens at Bab el-Mandeb determines whether this war produces a manageable economic shock or a generational one. Saudi Arabia cannot sustain export volumes without the Red Sea. Egypt cannot sustain its balance of payments without Suez Canal revenues. Asian economies cannot sustain industrial output if both straits close simultaneously. The Bab el-Mandeb is not a secondary concern. It is the keystone of the global response to the Hormuz closure.
Policy options
(1) Strong AI based maritime surveillance networks should be formed to detect suspicious movements. And the nations involved in trade should volunteer for strict time lined patrolling without warning and at the time of passing of ships.
(2) Alternative options should be initiated like developing land transport routes and enhancing pipeline networks.
(3) The ulterior motive of powerful nations to keep a watch on the seat trade thus acquiring and constructing bases on the land of different nations should be monitored and rules to stop them should be initiated.
Conclusion
The security challenges present in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait cannot be solved only through the hard power like military. A strategic approach combining diplomacy, economic development, technological innovation, and international co-operation is required. The chokepoint is necessary for trade and is the only option currently where the Strait of Hormuz is blocked at this point. Therefore, to protect this strait and prevent any war like situation near it is utmost priority. Its stability is essential for global trade, energy security, and economic growth.
Reference
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11. Houthi's are Positioned to Close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
12. Red Sea chokepoints are critical for international oil and natural gas flows