Summary
India’s Act East Policy was intended to deepen political, economic and strategic engagement with Southeast Asia, with ASEAN at its core. While diplomatic interaction has expanded and institutional frameworks have matured, tangible outcomes remain limited. Trade growth has stagnated, connectivity initiatives face persistent delays, and India’s strategic footprint is modest compared to other major regional actors. Existing literature suggests that the
constraints on Act East stem less from a lack of intent and more from implementation gaps, domestic economic caution and limited regional economic integration (Mohan, 2015;
Chatterjee Miller, 2022). This brief argues that unless India aligns its economic and connectivity strategies more closely with ASEAN priorities, Act East will continue to fall short of its ambitions. A recalibrated approach focused on delivery, sectoral cooperation and institutional coherence is required.
Introduction
India’s Act East Policy represents a central pillar of its engagement with Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. Introduced in 2014 as an upgrade of the Look East Policy, it aimed to move beyond symbolic diplomacy toward outcome-oriented cooperation in trade, connectivity, security and people-to-people ties (MEA, 2014). ASEAN was explicitly placed at the centre of this approach, reflecting its institutional role in shaping regional norms and multilateral processes.
This issue matters because Southeast Asia is critical to India’s economic growth, maritime security and regional influence. ASEAN collectively constitutes one of India’s largest trading partners and occupies strategic sea lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023). At the same time, ASEAN centrality underpins the regional architecture that India publicly supports through forums such as the East Asia Summit.
Despite sustained political engagement, outcomes remain uneven. Trade deficits persist,
infrastructure projects lag and India’s strategic role remains limited. This brief examines the political, economic, security and regional dimensions of India–ASEAN relations to explain why Act East has reached its limits.
Background
India’s modern engagement with Southeast Asia began in the early 1990s alongside economic liberalisation. India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1996 and a summit partner by 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2022). These
developments marked India’s gradual incorporation into ASEAN-led regional mechanisms.
The transition from Look East to Act East in 2014 signalled a more proactive posture, emphasising strategic and security cooperation alongside economic engagement (Jaishankar, 2020). Major milestones included the ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement in goods in 2010 and services and investment in 2014 (WTO, 2015). The partnership was elevated to a
strategic partnership in 2012 and a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2022.
Trade between India and ASEAN crossed USD 130 billion in the early 2020s, but growth has plateaued and remains below potential (UN Comtrade, 2023). Connectivity projects such as
the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project continue to face delays, highlighting persistent implementation challenges (ADB, 2021).
Key Issues
India enjoys considerable political goodwill within ASEAN as a non-coercive partner that respects sovereignty and avoids overt interference (Acharya, 2014). Regular summits,
ministerial meetings and cultural initiatives reinforce this perception. However, studies note that India’s engagement often lacks sustained institutional follow-through beyond high-level declarations (Chatterjee Miller, 2022).
ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making further constrains deep political cooperation.
India’s region-wide approach has sometimes failed to account for the diverse political
priorities of individual ASEAN members, reducing the effectiveness of bilateral engagement (Goh, 2019).
The economic dimension remains the weakest pillar of Act East. Although the ASEAN–India FTA exists, India’s exports are limited in diversity, while imports from ASEAN are more competitive, contributing to a widening trade deficit (Panagariya, 2019). This has reinforced domestic resistance to deeper trade liberalisation.
India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership further constrained its economic role in Southeast Asia (Menon, 2020). While driven by domestic considerations, this decision limited India’s participation in regional value chains increasingly centred in East and Southeast Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2023).
India and ASEAN share converging security concerns, particularly maritime security, freedom of navigation and non-traditional threats (Brewster, 2018). Naval exercises, port calls and capacity-building initiatives have expanded incrementally.
However, India’s strategic role remains secondary compared to other major powers due to limited defence exports, resource constraints and cautious strategic signalling (Pant & Joshi, 2021). ASEAN states value India as a balancing presence but do not view it as a primary security provider.
Act East intersects with India’s Indo-Pacific vision, which emphasises inclusivity and
ASEAN centrality (MEA, 2018). In practice, India’s growing focus on minilateral groupings such as the Quad has created ambiguity regarding priorities, even if these frameworks are not formally contradictory (Mohan, 2021).
Intensifying geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia further constrains India’s influence. ASEAN states increasingly hedge among major powers, prioritising economic benefits over strategic alignment, which disadvantages actors with limited economic leverage (Goh, 2019).
India’s Stakes
India’s economic stakes in ASEAN include access to dynamic markets, investment flows and regional supply chains essential for its manufacturing ambitions (ADB, 2023). Improved connectivity through Southeast Asia also offers developmental benefits for India’s northeastern states.
Strategically, ASEAN’s maritime geography is vital for India’s sea lines of communication and Indo-Pacific presence (Brewster, 2018). Politically, ASEAN support reinforces India’s
role as a credible regional stakeholder. Failure to deepen engagement risks marginalisation in a region central to emerging global economic and security architectures.
Challenges
Key challenges include slow implementation of connectivity projects, cautious economic integration, inadequate institutional coordination, limited strategic resources and ambiguity in balancing ASEAN centrality with minilateral engagement (Pant & Joshi, 2021; Menon, 2020).
Recommendations
India should prioritise timely completion of connectivity projects through stricter monitoring and inter-agency coordination (ADB, 2021). Economic engagement should focus on
sector-specific cooperation in digital services, clean energy and healthcare rather than broad tariff liberalisation (Panagariya, 2019).
Bilateral engagement with key ASEAN members should be strengthened alongside multilateral participation. Security cooperation must emphasise practical capacity-building aligned with ASEAN needs. Finally, a dedicated institutional mechanism within India could ensure coherence across trade, connectivity and security initiatives (Chatterjee Miller, 2022).
Conclusion
The limits of Act East reflect structural constraints and execution gaps rather than strategic neglect. India and ASEAN share complementary interests, but ambition has outpaced delivery. A focused, economically credible and institutionally coordinated Act East remains essential for India’s long-term relevance in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
References
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https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/19/3/395/5486527
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